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Abstract 
 
As various countries are preparing their national REDD+ strategies, balancing different types of 
knowledge and interests for legitimate and effective policies has become a primary, pressing challenge. 
Knowledge and discourses on REDD+ are deliberated in political bargaining processes between various 
actors involved in the policy domain that differ in their resources and capacity to influence outcomes. 
Using Tanzania as a country case, this study assesses the relative influence of deliberation and knowledge 
brokerage on the dynamics of the REDD+ policy process and its outputs vis-à-vis institutional structures 
and power relations between the involved policy actors. It is proposed that the more public and politicized 
the policy process, the less the discursive dimension may be ignored and the more there is to gain for 
discourse coalitions with wide bases of legitimacy among policy actors with varying power resources and 
institutionalized opportunities for policy influence.  
 
A structured survey and semi-structured in-depth interviews were carried out with sixty-four 
organizational actors involved in the Tanzanian REDD+ domain between March and September 2011. 
Social Network Analysis techniques were applied to analyze the quantitative survey data, complemented 
by a qualitative content analysis of the actors’ discourse and strategies related to the national REDD+ 
policy. The results suggest that through sustained public efforts, actors engaged in so-called protest events 
parallel to the formal government-led process have influenced the course of the policy process and to an 
extent, at the early formulation stage, policy content. Successful coalitions include brokers that occupy 
strategic positions in networks of information and resources, and have the capacity to enhance 
information flow and promote closure of REDD+ discourse on the appropriate policy proposals. Brokers 
that are characterized by discourses based on legitimized knowledge and ties to central policy actors have 
the greatest potential to enhance information flow and deliberation the policy process and outcomes. In 
the Tanzania case, there is considerable overlap between brokers and central actors, and the key brokers 
may be considered members of discourse coalitions rather than discursively neutral actors. Nevertheless, 
the influence of actors and coalitions that appear successful in the early stages of the policy process will 
be filtered by the institutional context applying to the formal decision making stages, and by shifting 
national and international political commitments to climate change mitigation and REDD+.        
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1. Introduction 
Climate change presents myriad threats to both human and nonhuman wellbeing. Because up to a quarter 
of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions stem from deforestation and forest degradation, the 
conservation and restoration of forests and woodlands is central to the global response to climate change. 
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) is a proposed mechanism to 
mitigate climate change while securing many additional environmental services provided by woodlands. 
In essence, this effort relies on payments by the international community to governments, communities, 
and individuals in return for maintaining and enhancing carbon stocks in forests, trees, and agricultural 
land. REDD+ has received international support in the recent United Nations Climate Change 
Conferences in Bali (COP-13), Copenhagen (COP-15), and Cancun (COP-16) where the Parties have 
agreed on the need for mechanisms to channel funds from developed countries to REDD+. Various 
tropical forest countries are currently preparing their REDD+ strategies in anticipation of an international 
compliance market.  
 
Despite the widespread support for REDD+, there remain significant hurdles to its successful 
implementation. Primary among these is the need to balance different interests and types of knowledge in 
ways that increase the effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness of policies. The volume of climate change 
research and policy discussion has grown exponentially in recent years (Grieneisen & Zhang, 2011), 
adding to the complexity faced by policy makers involved in the national REDD+ processes. Considering 
other complex influences, shifting international commitments, and moral intricacies (Hajer & Laws, 
2006), a key question for the analysis of processes shaping the effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness of 
policies is: how do policy makers make sense of this complexity and decide how to act? 
 
Policy makers are often dependent on interpreters of knowledge related to the complex concepts and ideas 
on climate change and the required global regime to regulate it.  Recommendations by scientists and 
advocacy groups regarding optimal mechanisms at different scales are typically based on data from 
empirical studies and experiences from previous policy implementation, claiming to represent ‘expert 
knowledge’. Although it is expected and sometimes assumed that scientists deliver ‘neutral’ information 
into policy making, the interpreters of scientific knowledge are not always void of political agendas (e.g. 
Grundmann, 2009; Haas, 1989). In general, policy outcomes are rarely the result of power-free 
deliberations where the best-supported argument wins, but rather of social bargaining processes between 
multiple actors (Arts & Buizer, 2009), which deliberation is part of. Moreover, the expert knowledge 
required to inform policy making is not limited to scientific knowledge, but may also encompass the 
expertise of societal actors such as NGOs and local knowledge of forest-dependent communities 
(Kleinschmit et al., 2009).  
 
This study aims to contribute to the understanding of the role of knowledge and deliberation for REDD+ 
policy decisions in increasingly politically charged contexts. It sets out to identify the multiple actors 
involved in emerging national REDD+ policy formulation, using Tanzania as a case study, and to analyse 
their understanding of the policy problem and the appropriate solutions, motivations and strategies in the 
policy process. Using a Policy Network Analysis approach, the study investigates the impacts of 
relational and institutional structures, agency, and deliberation on the policy process and its outputs. A 
particular focus is on the role of actors that function as policy brokers and may potentially enhance 
knowledge and resource flows among actors, promote closure and achievement of policy decisions, and 
ultimately, catalyse more legitimate and effective policy outcomes.  
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2. Conceptual framework  
Actors, networks, and opportunities as elements of a policy process 
 
Along with a shift from traditional governments towards multi-level, multi-actor governance, recent years 
have seen the institutionalization of diverse forms of consultation and public participation in policy 
formulation. Because the state needs technical expertise and local support for effective policy 
implementation, participatory policy making is increasingly seen a prerequisite for success (Arts, 2012: 
4). Policy actors are the multiple individuals and groups that are able pursue their goals, to varying 
degrees, in relation to a given policy initiative1.  
 
An increasingly popular and promising approach to study policy processes and outcomes stems from the 
recognition of interdependencies between policy actors (Arts, 2012). The term ‘policy networks’ is used 
to describe patterns of communication and resource interdependencies between a bounded set of policy 
actors. Lasting patterns of interaction form structures that pose both social constraints and opportunities 
on the actors’ action repertoires in the policy process. A policy domain delineates a system whose 
members are interconnected by multiple policy networks (Knoke et al., 1996; Knoke, 2011).  
 
The types of relations between policy actors in a given domain may consist of (cf. Knoke et al., 1996: 11):  
(1) resource networks, which include both material ties (exchanges/sharing of financial support, in-kind 
support, staff) and informational ties (exchanges of information, advice, expertise, data);  
(2) networks of meanings (i.e., shared concerns, beliefs/worldviews, discourses); and  
(3) participation in the same events.  
 
In this study, the focus is on networks formed by organizational actors in the domestic REDD+ policy 
process. Brass et al. (2004) review antecedents for the formation of interorganizational networks. There 
may be material motives such as acquiring resources and reducing transaction costs, or strategic motives 
related to forming alliances and attaining joint goals. Organizations also benefit from networking through 
learning, which in turn may enhance their performance. Networks have been found to enhance imitation 
and information diffusion. Trust is manifested in the likelihood of the creation of interorganizational ties 
through boundary spanning individuals within the organizations. Finally, there is evidence that 
interorganizational collaborations are more likely if partners have similar status and power (Ostrom, 
1990).  
 
Resource mobilization to advance policy goals is a central element in the policy network models (Knoke, 
2011). In addition, social movement scholars have drawn attention to the impact of political opportunity 
on the ability of different actors to influence policy processes and decisions. That is, actors’ prospects for 
resource mobilization, cultivating certain alliances over others, and the content of their claims and 
strategies in a policy debate are context-specific. The proponents of this theory strive to draw 
generalizable conclusions on how political opportunities are organized in time and space as opportunity 
structures. These include e.g. political openness and opposition as well as cleavages within the ruling elite 
(Meyer, 2004; Park, 2008). Some scholars also analyse institutional rules (e.g. Ingold & Varone, 2011) 
and institutionalized venues for communication and resource exchanges (Leifeld & Schneider, 2012) as 
opportunity structures.   
 
Both the network and opportunity structure theories have been criticized for downplaying the effects of 
human agency (e.g. Park, 2008). This suggested under-conceptualization concerns both the intentional, 
creative human action to challenge existing structures and reproduce them, as well as the meanings and 
                                                 
1 The broader term ‘stakeholders’ encompasses those who have an interest in particular policy decisions. Policy 
actors may be considered the subset of stakeholders that can influence a policy decision.       
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motivations attached to these actions, often with cultural underpinnings (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994). 
More recent work has intended to fill this gap, although disagreement remains among network analysts 
(Mische, 2011).  
 
Knowledge and deliberation 
 
There appear to be two approaches to investigating the role of knowledge for policy formation that have 
gained popularity over others. First, knowledge and expertise may be seen as power resources to 
legitimize and justify different governance goals and measures (cf. epistemic communities, Haas, 1989), 
mapping onto the resource mobilization and political bargaining model. Weaker actors that do not have 
the same access to ‘expert’ knowledge or the capacity to use it as more powerful actors, much less to 
contest it, are disadvantaged or even effectively disenfranchised in the political struggle (Kleinschmit et 
al., 2009). Furthermore, actors representing different scientific disciplines or sectors can be seen as 
political competitors that struggle to be seen as primary definers of problems and providers of scientific 
expertise to problems (Giessen et al., 2009). Instead of scientific consensus on the best way forward, 
interdisciplinary conflict may contribute to the complexity faced by policy makers.  
 
The second view, often misconceived as incompatible with the resource interdependency model, is the 
possibility of decision-making based on argumentation, which was re-introduced to policy theories in the 
early 1990s (e.g. Fischer & Forester, 1993). Dowding (2008: 150) argues that the reason why Sabatier’s 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF; Sabatier, 1987, 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993) has 
attracted so much interest is because it brought back the concept of ideas and their origins in the study of 
policy change, all the while being compatible with the bargaining model2. Sabatier roots the ways in 
which different policy actors understand and present policy problems and the appropriate solutions in 
belief systems. Central to Sabatier’s model is the concept of advocacy coalitions, which are made up of 
people who share the same normative and causal beliefs and often engage in concerted action. The beliefs 
consist of core beliefs or worldviews, seen as nearly immutable, and secondary beliefs that are reproduced 
through policy learning. Policy change is seen to occur through policy learning across coalitions, 
requiring change in the core beliefs of actors due to accumulated strong evidence.  
 
The emerging field of policy analysis that focuses on the role of ideas, presentations and argumentation in 
policy processes, and quite explicitly rejects the positivist ontology, may be labelled deliberative policy 
analysis. The deliberative orientation is argued to respond to the conditions increasingly present in arenas 
of multi-actor policy making which previous approaches to policy analysis, more tailored to the ‘old 
fashioned’ government decision making, fail to account for (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). First, it is now 
widely recognized that the linear model of ‘knowledge for policy’ is not feasible; we are increasingly 
aware that often policy decisions need to be made despite uncertainty and ambiguity (Hajer & Wagenaar, 
2003: 10; emphasis added). Rather than choosing which problems to solve and having the luxury to delve 
into them, policy makers have to manage a multitude of issues imposed upon them (Zahariadis, 1999). 
Second, it is recognized that the multiple policy actors involved in a given domain make sense of 
problems and appropriate solutions in varying ways, and that these differences complicate communication 
and consensus building. Yet, acknowledging the reality of interdependencies, some level of agreement is 
needed for a policy decision to be made, and the only way to achieve this is through deliberation (Hajer & 
Wagenaar, 2003: 11).   
 
Proponents of deliberative policy analysis draw our attention to frames, social constructs of the issue at 
hand that exist in the minds of people and in the social organization of which they are part, and affect the 
ways in which actors speak and behave. They cluster observations, experiences, interests, values and 
                                                 
2 It might also be argued that Sabatier’s model has been popular among some analysts because it maintains a largely positivist approach to policy 
analysis (cf. Sabatier, P. A. 1999. The need for better theories. In: Sabatier, P. A. (ed.) Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder: Westview Press).  
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beliefs in an attempt to make sense of the world (cf. Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Hajer & Laws, 2006). In 
policy negotiation processes, conflicting frames become subject to dialogue (Arts & Buizer, 2009). 
According to Rein (1983, cited in Wagenaar & Cook, 2003), by looking at the actions a policy actor 
favours, we may discover the implicit frame organizing that action. Similarly, Hajer (1995) roots frames 
in action by arguing that discourses, which ensemble ideas and concepts, are embedded – produced, 
reproduced and transformed – in social practices. Hajer (1993, 1995) presents an alternative approach to 
investigating coalition formation in policy processes. Actors engaging in what he calls discourse 
coalitions do not necessarily need to share the same beliefs; what are shared are the terms and concepts 
used to articulate a certain policy problem and/or the appropriate solutions. He introduces the term 
storylines to describe narratives of social reality in which actors combine ideas, concepts, and categories. 
Storylines allow actors to expand their discursive competence beyond their own expertise and experience. 
Through gaining wider acceptance in policy networks, storylines are political devices that can help reduce 
fragmentation and approach problem closure. Discursive institutionalization happens when the concepts 
articulated by a coalition come to be acted upon in the policy process, mediated by resource 
interdependencies (Hajer, 1995). It has been proposed that in order to be successful, a coalition has to 
dominate the discursive space (Hajer, 1993), exhibit stability and high ideational congruence among its 
core members, and attract a large constituency (Leifeld & Haunss, 2011).  
 
Brokerage 
 
Policy brokers or entrepreneurs are variously defined in policy literature as exceptional individuals that 
may have an instrumental impact on the policy process (e.g. Christopoulos & Ingold, 2011). From the 
network structural perspective, brokers occupy a position that links pairs of otherwise unconnected actors 
(Gould & Fernandez, 1989). Brokers may offer peripheral actors a vehicle to gain support for their 
agenda, including feeding new ideas and concepts into the network (Stevenson & Greenberg, 2000), and 
in boundary-spanning positions between coalitions, mediating between different interests in the policy 
process (Knoke, 2011). Hence, brokers have the potential to enhance more effective information flow and 
more equitable participation and decision making. But, brokerage also has potential high pay-offs. 
Depending on the situation, brokers may either benefit from maintaining gaps between unconnected 
actors, or from promoting closure (Burt, 2005). Several scholars present brokers as strategic or 
opportunistic actors mostly driven by self-interests (cf. Christopoulos & Ingold, 2011; Ingold & Varone, 
2011).  
 
Christopoulos and Ingold (2011: 39) introduce a useful conceptual distinction between policy brokers and 
policy entrepreneurs, based on the relational profile and intended behaviour of actors. They leave the 
concept ‘entrepreneur’ for opportunistic power brokers and manipulators of problematic preferences that 
are driven by expectations of personal gain. ‘Brokers’ are hypothesized to take on bridging and bonding 
roles that intend to increase stability and promote closure. Yet, they argue, brokers are strategic and 
advocate for certain positions, contrary to the previously assumed neutrality associated with mediating 
roles; if brokers had no self-interest at stake, why would they allocate scarce resources to brokerage 
activities (also Ingold & Varone, 2011: 4)? How successful brokers and entrepreneurs are depends on the 
political context (Christopoulos & Ingold, 2011), including institutions (Ingold & Varone, 2011).  
 
Analytical approach and objectives 
 
This study, to an extent, identifies itself with the mainstream tradition of political science in which policy 
processes are seen as political bargaining “games” between actors mediated by structural elements, be 
they relational, institutional or opportunity related. But it also follows other recent studies (Healey et al., 
2003; Ingold, 2011; Leifeld & Haunss, 2011; Leifeld & Schneider, 2012) in attempting to integrate the 
analysis of the effects of knowledge, agency and deliberation with the relational and institutional 
determinants of the policy process.   
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This goal has implications for the research approach, which integrates quantitative analysis of network 
structural properties and interpretative study on discourse coalitions in examining the role of knowledge 
and brokerage for the policy process and its outputs. In doing so, it rejects the often posited 
incompatibility of quantitative and interpretative methods (cf. Yanow, 2003) and follows others in 
suggesting that both have their merits, and that a mixed methods approach may be particularly fruitful in 
network analysis (Edwards, 2010). In this study, it is harnessed to study the impact of actions on policy 
making; to disclose the frames that order action, while highlighting the structural opportunities and 
constraints for the action.     
 
The two main objectives of the case study are  
(a) to understand the effects of deliberation and agency of discourse coalitions vis-à-vis the relational and 
institutional context on the REDD+ policy process and its outputs; and  
(b) to identify and characterize brokers that are in a position to enhance information flow, public 
deliberation and closure (and ultimately the legitimacy and effectiveness of REDD+ policy decisions); as 
well as to highlight the structural opportunities and constraints for their success.  
 
These objectives translate into the following research questions that the study intends to answer:  
(A) What characterizes coalitions that gain dominance in the discursive space and achieve discourse 
institutionalization on REDD+ domestic policy in Tanzania?  
(B) Is the success of the coalitions mediated primarily by the relational context (network positions) or 
political opportunity, including the effect of the institutional context?  
(C) What are the relational positions, strategies, and coalition alignment of brokers that successfully 
advocate for positions that in their view enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of REDD+ policy?  
3. Context and methods 
Study country: Tanzania  
 
In Tanzania, forests and woodlands cover about 33.5 million hectares. Around two thirds of them are on 
land with contested status of ownership and management regimes, and are perceived at a high risk of 
deforestation. REDD+ is seen as a promising way to counter this threat (www.reddtz.org).  
 
The formulation of a national REDD+ strategy is currently underway, facilitated by a specific national 
Task Force established for the purpose (www.reddtz.org). As an intermediary step, a National REDD 
Framework (URT, 2009) was developed. “Development of National REDD Strategy is a continuous 
process involving series of consultations, stakeholders engagement, research and knowledge 
dissemination” (www.reddtz.org). A draft national REDD+ strategy was made public in January 2011, 
and inputs were solicited through the website of the Task Force as well as through a series of stakeholder 
meetings organized in several zones across the country. A second draft of the national strategy, which 
ought to incorporate the inputs of these consultations, was still pending public release at the time this 
paper was drafted in May 2012. The period of data collection for this study, February-June 2011, could be 
characterized as a stage in the policy process in which policy actors were still making sense of the 
REDD+ policy problem and the various associated policy proposals, at the same time as the Task Force 
was soliciting comments for the first draft strategy document.   
 
An inclusive, participatory approach to policy making – at least in principle – is relative novel in 
Tanzania.  ‘New modes’ of multi-actor governance (Kronsell & Bäckstrand, 2010) have emerged in 
recent years in the wake of decentralization reforms in various sectors in the 1990s-early 2000s. These 
reforms could be seen as a response to both observed shortcomings of centralized governance since 
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colonial times, and, more pragmatically, to requirements by donors supporting sectoral development. The 
public consultations in preparation for the land law reforms in the 1990s were hailed as some of the most 
extensive in the history of Tanzanian policy making (e.g. Coldham, 1995), setting precedence for other 
policy processes. The REDD+ strategy development, on the outset, intends to follow suit.  
 
The differences among various actors in terms of access to information and knowledge resources are 
considerable. In this sense, stakeholders to the Tanzanian REDD+ policy process such as rural 
communities in remote forested areas and government organizations located in the power hub of the 
capital are in a very different position. It may be assumed that despite efforts to involve various 
stakeholders in national REDD+ policy process, their resources and influence in policy networks are 
likely to vary a great deal. Due to lack of material and informational resources, some stakeholders may 
not turn out to be effective policy actors at all. More powerful actors, with relatively higher capacities to 
assimilate concepts and discourse related to REDD+ and forest governance in general, in addition to 
material resources needed for participation and influencing other actors, are likely to dominate the 
national policy dialogue.     
 
The institutional context should also be kept in mind throughout the analysis. Despite the theoretical 
opportunities by all to contribute to policy content, in the end there will be no voting on the final content, 
but ultimately the REDD+ Task Force will decide on the proposal to be put forth to the cabinet and the 
parliament. This greater institutional predisposition for policy influence by some actors is likely to filter 
the effects of the relational context and agency of different actors.   
 
Methods 
 
The research approach of this study follows Policy Networks Analysis (PNA). The PNA draws from the 
principles and methods of Social Networks Analysis (e.g. Scott & Carrington, 2011), with a focus on the 
quantitative analysis of the impacts of relational constellations among policy actors on the policy process 
and its outcomes3. It allows to 
- analyze the structural constraints and opportunities for policy change; 
- analyze power relations within policy processes through identification of different roles and 
levels of influence of actors (Wasserman & Galaskiewicz, 1994).  
 
The first step was to map the core organizational actors in the national REDD+ domain, and the main 
national policy events and protest events related to the REDD+ policy development. Core organizations 
were defined as all organizations that consider themselves as part of the REDD policy domain and are 
perceived by others as such and thus able to influence (to varying degrees) the agenda setting, 
formulation and implementation of national REDD policies. The main policy events included in the 
analysis consist of a list of up to five critical, temporally located decision points in a collective decision-
making sequence that must occur in order for a policy option to be finally selected. A protest event is a 
collective, public action regarding issues in which explicit concerns around [REDD] are expressed as an 
important dimension, organized by non-state instigators with the explicit purpose of critique or dissent 
together with societal and/or political demands (Fillieule & Jiménez, 2003: 273). 
 
Based on the knowledge of the researcher and colleagues, preliminary lists of REDD policy actors and 
key policy and protest events in Tanzania were assembled. Next, a panel of seven key experts in the 
Tanzanian REDD+ policy domain (Table 1) was consulted through individual discussions to verify the 
actors and the events. The experts were allowed and encouraged to add relevant actors to the list. To 
consolidate a feasible sample using the criteria of relevance and potential influence on the Tanzanian 
national REDD+ process, organizations that had been mentioned three times out of seven or less were 
                                                 
3 vs. ‘policy networks’ as a heuristic device (see e.g. Christopoulos, 2008; Dowding, 2008) 
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discarded. However, a departure from this rule was the inclusion of three domestic business organizations 
in the sample in order to maintain private sector representation in the study. In addition, because the 
actors also had to consider themselves as part of the REDD+ domain, any organization which declined to 
have an interest in the national REDD+ policy, despite having been considered an actor by the experts, 
was excluded.  
 
Furthermore, the experts stressed the importance of local level actors, namely District Councils (DC) and 
Village Councils (VC), which are the lowest official units of government in the Tanzanian decentralized 
system. Since it was clearly impossible to cover all DC and VC that have a stake or take part in the 
process, two DC and four VC (two in each sampled district) were included. This small sample was not 
treated as representative of the two levels of government, and the intention was not to draw any 
conclusions about the involvement of districts and village councils in the national REDD+ policy process, 
but to begin to have an idea of the type of issues relevant to stakeholders at these levels. The criteria for 
selecting the DC and VC were that (a) they were implementing a REDD pilot project, and (b) the pilot 
project in question had a strong component of knowledge dissemination and awareness raising of REDD 
processes across levels of governance.   
 
Table 1. Participants of the expert panel. 
 
Type of org. Civil 
Society 
Donor Private 
sector 
Academic Government Total 
Experts 
consulted 
3 1 1 1 1 7 
 
 
Next, a social organization survey with high representatives of all core organizational actors on the final 
consolidated list was conducted. The survey elicited responses in a fixed choice format, covering 
questions on   
a) Organizational beliefs, stances on and meanings attached to REDD4; 
b) Partners in different kinds of relationships. The measured relations included 
1. Perceived influence on the domestic REDD+ policy process; 
2. Communication and information exchange on REDD+ policy matters; 
3. Sources of reliable scientific information; 
4. Contribution of substantial funds or in-kind resources5 to other policy actors; 
5. Receipt of substantial funds from other policy actors; 
6. Disagreement on REDD+ issues;  
7. Collaboration on REDD+ policy issues; 
c) Participation in the policy and protest events; 
d) Organization’s characteristics and resources.  
 
For data on the policy actors’ frames regarding the policy problem and appropriate solutions, and their 
narratives to describe the same, in-depth interviews were conducted, ideally with the politically most 
knowledgeable officer of each organization. In most cases, the same person participated in the survey and 
the in-depth interview. In some cases, a high-ranking official assigned another officer to answer the 
                                                 
4 Incl. thirty-five pre-defined statements about deforestation and forest degradation globally and nationally, and 
about potential challenges and policy proposals for REDD+ nationally; respondents signalled disagreement or 
agreement on a Likert scale 1-5 (0 = no organizational stance).    
5 Incl. payments and cost-sharing for services or goods, or voluntary contribution including co-sponsoring of 
activities of common interest; emphasis on the word substantial to exclude e.g. sporadic contribution of human 
resources in the form of participation in meetings etc.  
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survey; in those cases, it was ensured that the respondent was knowledgeable of the REDD+ domain and 
could speak for the whole organization. The in-depth interviews were based on a semi-structured guide of 
open-ended questions designed to encourage respondents to talk in some depth about their stances on 
REDD+ and their strategies of policy action and knowledge sharing. The interviews were recorded and 
later transcribed for analysis.  
 
Data from the social organization survey was analyzed using the UCINET social network software 
package, including NetDraw for visualization (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). The qualitative data 
from the in-depth interviews was coded using the Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA) freeware for 
qualitative category-based content analysis, which also allows the creation of network files readable by 
UCINET (Leifeld, 2011).   
 
The obvious weakness of the interview method from a policy process perspective was that data was only 
collected at one point in time, which does not allow detecting dynamic changes in actor frames, strategies, 
and relations from one decision point to another. To gain insight into how the actors’ strategies and 
actions have impacted the course of the policy process and the outputs produced, interview data was 
complemented by reviewing relevant documents spanning a timeline from the first policy event to May 
2012 when this paper was drafted (see Appendix I: Timeline of the national REDD+ policy process in 
Tanzania). These included official documents released by the government and donors supporting the 
REDD+ readiness activities, press releases and other statements by civil society actors, public 
correspondence between actors, and media reports. The same DNA software was used to analyze the 
content of some of the larger documents.   
4. Analysis and findings 
Policy actors, policy events and protests events 
 
The organizational composition of the sixty-four policy actors in the Tanzanian REDD+ policy domain 
that were identified and interviewed is presented in Figure 1. Throughout this paper, the actors are in most 
cases discussed at the level of their organizational type and by referring to code numbers, in order to 
maintain their anonymity.  
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Figure 1. Policy actors in the Tanzanian REDD+ policy domain, disaggregated by organizational type. N 
total = 64. 
 
The expert panel acknowledged altogether eight policy events in the national REDD+ policy process. 
There was a high consensus regarding three of the events, acknowledged by all seven experts; in addition, 
two events that were mentioned three times were included (Table 2). All the experts considered Policy 
event no. 1 as the start of the REDD+ policy process: the formal commitment by the government of 
Norway to support REDD readiness activities, including policy development, in Tanzania. Policy event 
no. 2 was important in bringing together a number of governmental and non-governmental REDD+ 
stakeholders. It involved the establishment of the national REDD+ Task Force and the development of an 
outline for the National Framework for REDD (URT, 2009), which laid out the foundations for the 
national REDD+ strategy development. Event no. 3, the National Forest Resources Monitoring and 
Assessment, had been initiated separately from the official REDD+ policy process but was considered 
highly relevant as the main means to provide the baseline information for REDD monitoring in Tanzania. 
The importance of policy event number four, the Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) for the World 
Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), for the national REDD+ policy process in Tanzania may 
be reduced compared to some other countries, since the national policy development was already 
underway with the Norwegian support. Nevertheless, Tanzania wished to join in the somewhat parallel 
process for knowledge and experience exchange opportunities with other participating countries. The R-
PP was streamlined with the Draft National REDD+ Strategy. It also links to the chain of protest events 
by civil society organizations (Table 3).  The publication of the first Draft National REDD+ Strategy 
(URT, 2011) was considered one of the most important REDD+ policy events in the country thus far 
(event no. 5).   
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Table 2. The relevant REDD+ policy events included in the analysis.  
 
No. Event name Proposal / 
Decision Date 
Main decision/ policy proposal 
1 Letter of Intent with 
Norway regarding REDD 
March 2008 Signing of the Letter of Intent on REDD 
between Tanzania and Norway. Quick-start 
activities defined: pilot projects, in-depth 
studies, national REDD strategy development. 
2 Kibaha conference January 2009 Stakeholders' workshop for the development of 
the National Framework for REDD. National 
REDD Task Force appointed.   
3 NAFORMA June 2010 National Forest Resources Monitoring and 
Assessment started with support by the 
government of Finland. 
4 R-PP November 
2010 
Development of the Readiness Preparation 
Proposal for the Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility, submitted in October 2010 and 
approved in November 2010. 
5 Draft National REDD+ 
Strategy 
January 2011 Draft national REDD+ strategy made public in 
January 2011; comments solicited through a 
national website and a series of zonal 
consultations. 
 
 
The three civil society experts in the panel provided information on REDD related protest events in 
Tanzania. The same experts were also high-ranking officials in the leading organizations of these events. 
All the protest events that were included in the study (Table 3) were conventional protests, defined as 
“demands for judicial review, actions such as collective representations to officials or elected politicians, 
public meetings, leafleting and the collection of signatures on petitions” (Rootes, 2003: 31). These events 
stemmed from the frustration of a number of civil society organizations (‘CSO’, including national and 
international NGOs, professional associations and the private sector) who considered that the national 
REDD strategy development had become an increasingly closed process since the Kibaha conference in 
early 2009, with few public consultations and a prolonged delay in the publishing of the draft strategy. 
The core group behind the protest events consisted mostly of NGOs piloting REDD+ projects in different 
parts of the country with the start-up support by Norway. An umbrella organization for national NGOs 
working on issues of natural resource governance functioned as the convening actor.  
 
Figure I in Appendix 1 presents the timeline of the national REDD+ policy process in Tanzania, 
highlighting the key policy and protest events included in the study.  
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Table 3. The REDD+ protest events included in the analysis.  
 
Protest event description Scale Date Links to  
policy event no. 
A group of CSOs submit comments on the 
Tanzanian R-PP to the FCPF. 
National November 
2010 
4 
CSOs submit recommendations for the National 
REDD strategy to the Task Force.  
National November 
2010 
5 
CSOs sign a statement for the Tanzanian 
negotiators in the COP 16 in Cancun regarding 
what a global agreement on REDD+ should look 
like. 
National, 
International  
November 
2010 
- 
Breakfast debate titled “How do we solve the 
conflicts in the politics of Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Degradation?"  
National January 2011 5 
NGOs piloting REDD+ in Tanzania discuss the 
draft national REDD+ strategy and draw a 
statement of key suggestions for improvement, 
submitted to the Task Force. 
National February 2011 5 
 
 
Non-response was less than five per cent in the structured survey and 23% in the qualitative interviews. In 
cases in which it was particularly difficult to elicit a response from an actor to our interview requests, the 
in-depth interview was dropped in order to secure at least the structured survey data (the quantitative 
network analysis being more sensitive to biases due to missing data). However, this was primarily only 
done in case of seemingly marginal actors, i.e. actors not receiving ties from other interviewed actors.  
 
Characterizing the relational context: networks and actor positions 
 
Data analysis was begun by conducting a number of network level measures regarding the seven relations 
included in the structured survey (Table 4). These network level measures characterize whole networks 
and provide an idea of the relational-structural context in which individual policy actors operate.  
 
Table 4. Network level measures (N nodes for all networks = 64). 
Measure/ 
Network  
Influential 
actors 
REDD+ 
information 
exchange 
Sources of 
reliable 
scientific 
information  
Resources 
received 
from 
others  
Resources 
contributed 
to others 
Disagreement 
on REDD+ 
issues 
REDD+ 
collaboration   
Density  0.282 0.158 0.077 0.057 0.040 0.008 0.117 
Centralization  0.520 0.452 0.503 0.184 0.314 0.088 0.269 
Fragmentation  0.236 0.154 0.414 0.580 0.781 0.987 0.246 
Reciprocity  0.207 0.266 0.120 0.046 0.006 0.000 0.227 
Homophily     
(E-1 indexa)  0.520 0.485    0.485 
a Partitioning variable: organizational type.  
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The low overall densities, high centralization and low fragmentation reflect core-periphery structures that 
especially the networks of influence, communication and collaboration exhibit. That is, there is a core 
group of densely connected actors (“leaders”), and a periphery of other actors (“followers”) loosely 
connected to the core and to one another, if at all (Valente, 2010).  The relatively higher fragmentation of 
resource networks is due to the significance of one actor, representing the government of Norway, 
eclipsing all the rest as a source of REDD+ funding. The high fragmentation of the disagreement network 
is explained by few interviewees being willing to nominate others that they would disagree with in 
REDD+ policy issues (although the analysis of frames below demonstrates that disagreements do exist). 
Homophily, or the tendency of actors to establish ties with others sharing the same attribute (in this case, 
organizational type) was measured for networks of information and collaboration, and will be discussed 
in sections 4.3 and 4.5.   
 
The central position of an organization in a network is usually considered a good indicator of power and 
status. The centrality measures calculated here for the policy actors in the various networks include in-
degree (the number of nominations/ties received) and Freeman betweenness (the relative number of times 
actor k lies on the geodesic linking j and i) (Valente, 2010). In-degree is used to measure centrality in 
networks of influence, sources of scientific information, resources, and disagreement, because of interest 
in the “popularity” of an organization or the extent to which other actors perceive it relevant. 
Betweenness is used for the networks of communication and collaboration to detect actors in potentially 
strategic positions in networks of information and resource flow. In both networks, there was a strong 
positive correlation (at 0.01 level) between the actor in-degree centrality and betweenness scores.    
 
Table 5 compiles the normalized centrality measures for the top ten most central actors in terms of their 
perceived influence on domestic REDD+ policy decisions in all networks. Figures 2-7 highlight the 
positions of the actors in the various networks vis-à-vis their centrality. The same five actors – two 
government executive departments that comprised two thirds of the national REDD+ Task Force in 2011 
(no. 10 and 19), a research organization that functions as the Task Force Secretariat (22), a national 
university (21), and the foreign government agency representing Norway (59) – are the most central ones 
in most of the networks. An intergovernmental organization with a large multi-country REDD initiative 
(52) and two national NGOs (34 and 35) are not far behind.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
Table 5. Normalized degree and betweenness centrality of the top 10 most influential actors (as perceived 
by others) in the Tanzanian REDD+ policy domain.  
 
Organization 
Influence 
(in-deg.) 
Information 
sharing 
(betw.) 
Scientific 
information 
source (in-
degr.) 
Resources 
received 
(in-degr.) 
Resources 
contributed 
(in-degr.) 
Disagreeme
nt (in-
degr.) 
REDD+ 
collaboration 
(betw.) 
010 (Gov’t, Task 
Force)  
79.4 23.0 31.7 23.8 1.6 4.8 15.0 
019 (Gov’t, Task 
Force)  
76.2 0 22.2 3.2 1.6 9.5 17.8 
022 (Research, Task 
Force Secretariat)  
63.5 4.8 57.1 15.9 12.7 4.8 7.0 
021 (Research)  58.7 0.9 42.9 15.9 7.9 3.2 0.6 
059 (Foreign gov't 
agency)  
54.0 8.3 19.0 12.7 34.9 1.6 3.2 
052 (Intergov't)  50.8 3.8 17.5 9.5 9.5 0 3.4 
053 (Intergov't)  47.6 0.4 14.3 4.8 4.8 1.6 0.2 
034 (National NGO)  46.0 9.3 15.9 9.5 9.5 3.2 14.4 
035 (National NGO)  46.0 4.7 14.3 12.7 9.5 1 0 
054 (Intergov't)  46.0 0 22.2 11.1 4.8 0 0 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Centrality in the network of perceived influence. The size of a node corresponds to its in-degree 
centrality. 
Gov't executive actor
National NGO
Educational, research
National business
International NGO
International business
Intergovernmental organization
Foreign government agency
District or village council
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Figure 3. Centrality in the network of communication and REDD+ information sharing. The size of a 
node corresponds to its betweenness centrality. 
Figure 4. Centrality in the network of sources of reliable scientific information on REDD+. The size of a 
node corresponds to its in-degree centrality. 
Gov't executive actor
National NGO
Educational, research
National business
International NGO
International business
Intergovernmental organization
Foreign government agency
District or village council
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Figure 5. Centrality in the network of received resources. The size of a node corresponds to its in-degree 
centrality. 
 
Figure 6. Centrality in the network of resources contributed to others. The size of a node corresponds to 
its in-degree centrality. 
Gov't executive actor
National NGO
Educational, research
National business
International NGO
International business
Intergovernmental organization
Foreign government agency
District or village council
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Figure 7. Centrality in the network of collaboration in REDD+ policy issues. The size of a node 
corresponds to its betweenness centrality. 
 
 
The importance of being a central actor for the diffusion of knowledge, ideas and concepts is highlighted 
by Figure 8. Even the networks in which reciprocated ties might be expected, those of communication and 
collaboration, exhibit low reciprocity (Table 4). Following  Leifeld & Schneider (2012), it was 
hypothesized that information exchange is not fully reciprocated, because actors that are perceived more 
influential receive more information ties, or attempts to establish these ties, by other actors. The 
hypothesis was confirmed by a strong positive correlation (Pearson correlation co-efficient 0.8532, 
significant at 0.005 level) between an actor’s centrality in the network of communication and REDD+ 
information exchange and that of the network of influence (Figure 8). This may mean that other actors 
seek out the actors that are perceived influential as sources of information, and it may also mean that 
central actors have an advantage over others in terms of accessing new information. 
Gov't executive actor
National NGO
Educational, research
National business
International NGO
International business
Intergovernmental organization
Foreign government agency
District or village council
 
 
17 
 
 
Figure 8. Correlation between in-degree centrality in the network of communication and REDD+ 
information exchange, and in-degree centrality in the network of perceived influence for domestic 
REDD+ policy decisions.  
 
Participation in the same events and institutionalized venues for collaboration and communication 
 
Participation in the same events may open opportunities to policy actors for the establishment of new 
information and resource ties, and ultimately, influence. It was tested whether this was true for the 
Tanzanian policy actors engaged in the key REDD+ policy and protest events. In addition, the effect of 
involvement in institutionalized venues for information sharing and collaboration was considered. These 
included affiliations with (a) the group of NGOs piloting REDD with Norwegian support, (b) NGOs 
participating in the Forestry Working Group hosted by Tanzania Natural Resources Forum, (c) the 
national REDD+ Task Force, including the Secretariat, and (d) Development Partners, a group of the 
main Overseas Development Aid contributors to Tanzania, including foreign government agencies and 
intergovernmental organizations. 
 
Simple correlations (Table 6) appear to suggest a relationship between formal participation in policy 
events and collaborative, information and scientific information exchange ties, and protest event 
participation and information exchange. Scientific information exchange and affiliation with the above 
collaboration venues is correlated with REDD+ information exchange and collaboration. 
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Table 6. Correlations between networks of information and collaboration, and participation in policy 
events and venues. 
 
 Collaboration  Information 
exchange 
Scientific information 
exchange 
 Jaccard coefficient, 
Sig. 
Jaccard coefficient, 
Sig. 
Jaccard coefficient, Sig. 
Participation in policy events 
(formal participation)ª 
0.183     0.000** 0.240     0.000** 0.128     0.000** 
Participation in protest 
eventsª 
0.082     0.011 0.092     0.001** 0.025     0.548 
Participation in other venues 
for collaborationª 
0.151     0.000** 0.144     0.000** 0.062     0.120 
Scientific information 
exchangeº 
0.271     0.000** 0.258     0.000**  
ª Dichotomized relations: any shared event/structure=1, no shared events/structures=0.  
º Transposed data, directed tie from sender to receiver of scientific information. 
 
 
However, performing a multiple regression analysis in an attempt to predict one relation knowing the 
other weakens these associations (Table 7).  Shared organizational type is included as an independent 
variable.  
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Table 7. Multiple regression quadratic assignment procedure for networks of collaboration, information 
exchange, and scientific information exchange (number of permutations for each model: 2000).   
 
Dependent variable: collaboration       
R-square Adj R-Sqr Probability           
 0.088        0.087          0.000                
# of Obs 4032       
  Un-stdized 
Coefficient 
Stdized 
Coefficient 
Sig. Proportion 
as Large 
Proportion 
as Small 
Std Err 
Intercept 0.06 0.00     
Participation in other venues for 
collaborationª 
0.12 0.15 0.00** 0.00 1.00 0.03 
Participation in policy eventsª 0.08 0.22 0.00** 0.00 1.00 0.02 
Participation in protest eventsª 0.01 0.01 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.02 
Organizational type 0.08 0.07 0.00** 0.00 1.00 0.02 
Dependent variable: Information exchange 
R-square Adj R-Sqr Probability           
 0.125        0.124       0.000 
 # of Obs 4032       
  Un-stdized 
Coefficient 
Stdized 
Coefficient 
Sig. Proportion 
as Large 
Proportion 
as Small 
Std Err 
Intercept 0.08 0.00     
Participation in other venues for 
collaborationª 
0.09 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.99 0.03 
Participation in policy eventsª 0.12 0.28 0.00** 0.00 1.00 0.02 
Participation in protest eventsª 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.99 0.02 
Organizational type 0.08 0.07 0.00** 0.00 1.00 0.02 
Dependent variable: Scientific information sharingº  
R-square Adj R-Sqr Probability           
 0.044       0.043         0.000               
 # of Obs 4032 
 
     
  Un-stdized 
Coefficient 
Stdized 
Coefficient 
Sig. Proportion 
as Large 
Proportion 
as Small 
Std Err 
Intercept 0.05 0.00     
Participation in other venues for 
collaborationª 0.01 0.02 0.29 0.29 0.71 0.02 
Participation in policy eventsª 0.06 0.21 0.00** 0.00 1.00 0.01 
Participation in protest eventsª -0.01 -0.02 0.32 0.68 0.32 0.02 
Organizational type 0.02 0.02 0.20 0.20 0.80 0.02 
ª Valued relations: no. of shared opportunity structures (1-2) or shared events (1-5).  
º Transposed data, directed tie from sender to receiver of scientific information. 
 
 
It may be concluded that formal participation in the same policy events increases the likelihood of 
collaboration, information sharing, and scientific information exchange; and that participation in the same 
institutionalized venues for collaboration increases the likelihood of collaboration. Shared organizational 
type also appears to be a predictor of collaboration and information exchange.  To contrast the last result, 
it should be noted that the degree of organizational homophily for these networks is low (Table 4). That 
is, at the level of whole networks, actors are not especially prone to seeking relations with others sharing 
the same organizational type. This is related to the core-periphery structures which span actors of several 
organizational types.   
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Core frames and discourse coalitions 
 
Overall, there was a high consensus among the survey respondents and in-depth interviewees regarding 
REDD+ as an appropriate policy instrument to address deforestation and forest degradation (Figure II, 
Appendix 2). Most of them also agreed with such normative expectations as the need for REDD+ to 
deliver co-benefits for biodiversity and poverty reduction (Figure III, Appendix 2).  Furthermore, there 
was broad consensus regarding the main challenges for achieving an effective REDD+ policy in Tanzania 
(Table 8; Figure IV, Appendix 2). Divergence of stances was evident only when it came to the 
appropriate mechanisms to arrange REDD+ financial flows and rewarding for emission reductions 
(Figure 8; Figure V, Appendix 2).  
 
Table 8. The main challenges for achieving an effective national REDD+ policy in Tanzania mentioned 
by in-depth interview participants (coded qualitative data).  
 
 All interviewees 
(n=35) 
Government and 
donor (n=12) 
Others (n=23) 
Main challenge for REDD+ Count % Count % Count % 
Governance  20 57.1 5 41.7 15 65.2 
Energy structure: charcoal 19 54.3 6 50.0 13 56.5 
Poor inter-sectoral engagement and coordination 17 48.6 7 58.3 10 43.5 
Poor awareness and understanding of REDD as 
concept and opportunity 
15 42.9 5 41.7 10 43.5 
Unclear land, forest and carbon tenure 13 37.1 5 41.7 8 34.8 
Global uncertainty over REDD 9 25.7 4 33.3 5 21.7 
Economic structure: agriculture 8 22.9 3 25.0 5 21.7 
Controlling leakage 7 20.0 3 25.0 4 17.4 
Poor coordination of current and past policy efforts 4 11.4 1 8.3 3 13.0 
 
An analysis of the storylines that the various stances are part of, and the actors who ‘utter’ these storylines 
(Hajer, 1995) explains why there appears to be widespread consensus or closure regarding the key issues, 
some of them predominantly normative (e.g., benefits for people and biodiversity), some backed by a 
number of research studies and policy analyses (e.g., the significance of the energy and agricultural 
drivers of deforestation), but fragmentation regarding the appropriate policy responses. Next, the actors 
behind the polarizing policy proposals are identified, discussing the underlying frames that favour certain 
actions.   
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Figure 9. Stances by actors, grouped according to organizational type, regarding the statement “All 
REDD accounting and payments should go through the national governments”. Key: 1 – Strongly 
disagree; 2 – Disagree; 3 - Neither agree nor disagree; 4 – Agree; 5 – Strongly agree.   
 
Although there is a weakness in the formulation of the question depicted in Figure 8, lumping accounting 
and rewarding in the same statement, it captures the main disagreement between what may be identified 
as two opposing discourse coalitions in the Tanzanian REDD+ policy domain. That is, there were 
(mostly) government actors who considered all REDD+ accounting and rewarding best handled at the 
national level by the central government, and those who feared that a national reward mechanism – more 
concretely, a national REDD+ trust fund – would impede the REDD+ benefits from reaching those who 
incur costs from forest emission reductions, i.e. forest adjacent rural communities. The difference 
between the organizational groups in Figure 8 was significant (1-way ANOVA, F=3.13, Sig. at 0.005 
level).   
 
A negative stance towards a national REDD+ trust fund was more prevalent among those actors who had 
participated in protest events than those who had not (1-way ANOVA, F=19.38, Sig. at 0.005 level). As 
previously described, these actors were mostly domestic and international NGOs piloting REDD+ 
projects in various parts of Tanzania, with support by the Norwegian REDD+ readiness funding. They 
initially came together for sharing experiences and knowledge, but found that they all shared a frustration 
with the sluggish government-led national REDD+ policy process, which led to their mobilization and the 
protest events. This group exhibits a stable core of actors across the protest events (Appendix 3), which 
has been suggested as one of the determining characteristics of a discourse coalition (Leifeld & Haunss, 
2011). The leading actors of this coalition are among the most central actors of the Tanzanian REDD+ 
domain (organizations no. 34 and 35, Table 5). Their arguments were centred on the importance of 
communities’ rights to carbon benefits and participation; i.e. strong normative notions regarding the 
importance of issues of fairness for the domestic REDD+ policy, consistent with the main demands of the 
protest events. They also saw REDD+ as a chance to finally channel significant rewards for forest 
management to local communities, as opposed to the long-prevailing idea in the forestry sector regarding 
local responsibilities to participate in forest management, with or without compensation. Hence REDD+ 
was also seen as an opportunity to improve the effectiveness of management through increased 
incentives.  
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Most members of this “protest coalition” were for a national accounting approach, considered necessary 
to tackle leakage of deforestation from areas under REDD+ regimes to other forest areas. They did not 
consider that national level accounting and a centralized approach to benefit sharing should go hand in 
hand. “We’re not opposed to a national accounting system. We think there should be a national 
accounting system. But what we’re opposed to is a national reward system. And the reason being that 
there’s no history in Tanzania of a national government capturing basically rewards from natural 
resources at the national level, and then taking them to communities” (interview, domestic NGO 
representative, 30 March 2011). “… from our past experience, in debt collection in this country it is 
always the treasury, for it to come to the communities is close to impossible. If it comes, it is really very 
small” (interview, domestic NGO representative, 20 April 2011). Hence the protests against a national 
level reward mechanism appeared to stem from a frame of ineffective and unfair centralized benefit 
sharing, based on previous experience (cf. TFWG, 2010). A related feature in the covert opinions of civil 
society actors and also some donor agencies – hinted at in the interviews despite officially generally 
positive stances on REDD – was REDD+ as a potential threat to communities’ land and forest rights that 
the legal reforms of the late 1990s aimed to secure; an incentive for recentralization and government 
appropriation of resources.  
 
A positive stance towards a centralized system of accounting and rewarding was, as mentioned above, 
associated with government organizations, including the members of the national REDD+ Task Force, 
two of them considered the most central actors in the whole REDD+ domain (Table 5). The discourse of 
these actors was also littered with references to equity and fairness of benefit sharing, and the need for 
REDD+ to produce co-benefits for poverty reduction and biodiversity. But while the “protest coalition” 
members were explicit about their fairness goals, what appeared to drive these government actors were 
mainly concerns over fulfilment of technical qualifications for international REDD+ funding. Like the 
opposing coalition, they stressed REDD+ as an opportunity to secure long-term funding for forest 
management, but with emphasis on addressing national level priorities. “Tanzania has a lot of areas set 
aside as reserves and most are the forest but…. we have been participating in conserving the forest of 
course without any reward, from our understanding that natural resources, particularly forest, are very 
important for the good environment, you see. But now there is this chance, after Kyoto protocol, there is 
this chance where people dealing with conservation, forest planting, forest… they will be rewarded 
something” (interview, member of the Task Force, 22 March 2011). In their arguments, the government 
had a key role as an intermediary between the local sellers of carbon credits and the international market. 
“We don’t want… after all there is no deadline, why don’t we have a good mechanism so that we move 
with our people, if there is any advantage then let them get that advantage, but don’t just rush to open up 
and people will be cheated, and will end up as a loser, not the government but people will be losing, and 
of course, those who are ruling, they will be… people will get angry to the people who are in position, so 
we didn’t want that” (interview, member of the Task Force, 22 March 2011). Thus, while seen as a covert 
attempt at recentralization by some of the CSOs, the push for centralized accounting and rewarding by the 
government actors may also be ordered by a frame of the government being held accountable for failing 
to protect local interests (and the associated potential political defeat). In fact, the government has 
recently been accused of exactly that, in relation to land grabbing by foreign investors (cf. TNRF et al., 
2012).    
 
It must be re-iterated that while we talk about a “protest coalition” mainly drawing members from the 
civil society, especially those involved in the protest events, and a “government coalition” including the 
2011 Task Force members, based on the core frames of the core actors, the boundaries of these two 
discourse coalitions are loose and do not fully match with our (imposed) typology of organizational types. 
As Table 9 below demonstrates, there was considerable variation within the organizational groupings 
regarding the key issues that they promoted in the national REDD+ policy development. For example, 
some government executive departments would have liked to see different structures of rewarding and 
accounting in Zanzibar and the Tanzanian mainland, and were for a nested approach. One big 
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international conservation organization differed from the rest of the NGOs in supporting a national 
approach, despite having participated in the protest events.  A considerable number of actors stated that 
they had no specific goals that they were actively promoting, especially the academic and research 
organizations (Table 9). These organizations cannot be easily mapped as part of any discourse coalition.    
  
Table 9. Main goals of the various organizational policy actors regarding the national REDD+ policy 
(percentage of actors within each organizational grouping that mentioned the goal).  
 
Organizational goal 
regarding national REDD+ 
policy 
District, 
village 
council 
(n=6) % 
Gov't 
executive 
dept 
(n=15) % 
Research/ 
educational  
(n=4) % 
National 
NGO 
(n=14) 
% 
Business 
(national/ 
foreign, 
n=4) % 
Int'l 
NGO 
(n=7) 
% 
Inter-
gov't 
(n=5) % 
Foreign 
gov't 
agency 
(n=4) % 
Equity in REDD+ benefit 
sharing 33 20 0 36 25 43 20 25 
Nested approach to benefit-
sharing 50 20 0 29 25 43 20 0 
Effective MRV system 17 7 0 0 0 29 60 50 
Equity in participation in 
REDD+ policy formulation 
and implementation 
17 0 0 36 50 29 0 0 
Private sector participation in 
REDD+ policy formulation 
and implementation 
0 7 0 7 50 0 20 25 
More capacity building on 
REDD+ for all actors 50 7 0 7 0 0 20 0 
Social and biodiversity 
safeguards 0 0 0 14 0 43 20 0 
REDD+ as part of holistic 
climate change adaptation 
and mitigation efforts 
0 7 25 0 0 14 0 25 
National approach to 
accounting and benefit-
sharing 
0 20 0 7 0 0 0 25 
Clarified land, forest and 
carbon tenure 0 0 0 36 0 14 0 0 
Effectively addressing 
drivers of DD 0 27 0 14 0 0 0 0 
Improved forest governance 33 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 
Compatibility of REDD+ 
with sectoral planning 0 7 0 7 0 0 20 0 
Gender equity in REDD+ 
participation and benefit 
sharing 
0 0 0 0 0 14 20 0 
Land use planning as part of 
REDD+ 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Integration to carbon markets 0 0 25 7 0 0 0 0 
Forest conservation 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Indigenous people's rights 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 
Forest certification 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 
No specific organizational 
goals 0 33 75 14 0 14 20 25 
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Note: coded data, responses to open-ended survey questions regarding key policy proposals and goals in the protest events. Only 
the interviewed actors have been included.  
 
Unpacking the concept of “governance” in Tables 8 and 9 helps understanding how the storylines of the 
different policy actors assemble ideas of the current challenges. The most salient governance concerns for 
the REDD+ policy among all in-depth interviewees were related to rent-seeking on different levels of 
government. The extent of governance shortfalls in the forestry sector, particularly in relation to illegal 
logging in the Southern part of the country, was exposed in a report by TRAFFIC and partners in 2007 
(Milledge et al., 2007). The report was widely endorsed, and it is hard for any actor, including the 
government, to deny the existence of this problem. Other challenges mentioned – frequently in relation to 
the first issue – could be categorized as concerns over transparency in decision-making and 
implementation, non-implementation of laws and policies, and distrust between the authorities and the 
public. CSO and donor actors tended to link non-implementation with rent-seeking and elite capture in 
their arguments, whereas it was predominantly associated with resource shortages in the government 
actors’ narratives.  
 
A governance-related concern, separated as a category in Table 8, was that of unclear land, forest, and 
carbon tenure (see also Table 9). On the CSO side, this was mainly seen to be related to varying 
interpretations of the land and forest laws, considered progressive on paper but poorly implemented. The 
operationalization of the different legal land categories in the REDD+ policy, with important implications 
for benefit sharing and especially for the communities’ access to benefits, had become the focus of 
targeted advocacy efforts (Table 9; TFCG & MJUMITA, 2011). The government actors also mentioned 
the land tenure situation as a challenge (Table 8), but for a different reason. To them, government 
ownership over land was unquestioned (contrary to spirit of the decentralized policies and CSO claims), 
so which legal provisions to draw from when planning benefit sharing? The refusal to acknowledge 
communities’ lands and treating them as general lands under the central government (cf. TFCG & 
MJUMITA, 2011) appeared to stem from an equation of common pool resource management with open 
access. “Here we have another challenge where, when you have something for community, communal 
land, it belongs to nobody except for… communal […] Now, collective, to have collective responsibility, 
for community members to make sure that this is ours, it is also very difficult, and that’s why you see 
forest in Tanzania, where you have the public forest, that is where all this problem of encroachment, 
deforestation, that is where it is taking place. Because it is communal, it is public land, public forest, so 
even communal, once it belongs to nobody…” (interview, member of the Task Force, 22 March 2011). 
This also seemed to be related to the distrust between levels of governance, especially the central 
government and village communities, in resource management, as suggested by the CSOs.  
 
Comparing the REDD+ discourses of the two coalitions on the whole, that of the “protest coalition” was 
characterized by strong, concise messages, focusing on communities’ rights and the need for social and 
environmental safeguards to ensure the effectiveness and legitimacy of REDD+ schemes (interview data; 
cf. REDD Pilot Projects, 2011; TFWG, 2009, 2010). A salient feature in the discourse of the “government 
coalition”, in turn, was the highlighting of ambiguity, describing REDD+ as something new and not yet 
entirely within the grasp of most national policy actors as a concept and a policy problem. “We don’t 
know where we are going, when we are going conclude the negotiation under REDD, how REDD is 
going to be implemented, and if you think about REDD you can find, you can meet a lot of questions, and 
some of the questions they have no answers” (interview, member of the Task Force, 22 March 2011). In 
contrast, according to the Executive Summary of the second draft National REDD+ Strategy (URT, 2011: 
6), the ‘preliminary analytical phase’ of policy development had already been completed by the time the 
interviews were carried out. 
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Knowledge pathways and brokerage 
 
As part of the preliminary analytical phase of the national REDD+ strategy development, the Task Force 
commissioned a number of in-depth studies on various aspects of REDD+ policy options, specifically 
regarding the Tanzanian context, in 20106. In spite of this, and the REDD+ communication and 
information sharing network that all of the surveyed organizations were part of (Figure 3), half of the in-
depth interviewees considered access to REDD relevant knowledge a challenge for effectively 
participating in the policy process. The relevant knowledge did not only include scientific or research-
based knowledge; in fact, the majority of the survey respondents (63%), including members of both 
discourse coalitions, were in agreement that scientific experts were not the best and final authority on 
REDD+. Research-based knowledge was only ranked first in terms of relevance for REDD+ policy 
decisions by the research organizations (n=4) and international NGOs (n=6) among the respondents. Half 
of the government organizations (n=10) valued local knowledge the most, whereas the national NGOs 
(n=9) rated practical knowledge, accumulated through their own work, the highest7. The other 
organizational groupings were more spread out in their rankings. It could be speculated that the core 
actors of both coalitions considered the key policy issues ‘un-scientific’ and more in the realm of political 
bargaining; i.e., research might provide inputs for the arguments of the policy actors, but does not play a 
definite role for policy decisions. “REDD is based on community participation rather than scientific 
findings” (national NGO representative, 4 April 2011). It was also lamented that most scientists involved 
were natural scientists with little understanding of the social-political ramifications of REDD+. Hence the 
role of scientific experts seemed to have been reserved for the technical issues related to monitoring, 
reporting, and verification (MRV).  “Reference levels are technical and it is the domain of experts” 
(REDD consultant, national private business, 8 April 2011). When the survey respondents were asked if 
scientific experts dominated the national REDD+ policy discussion, less than half (44%) responded in the 
affirmative, with no significant differences among the organizational groupings or discourse coalitions.  
 
Yet, when the survey respondents were asked to indicate which sources of information their organizations 
regularly/routinely relied on to enhance their understanding of REDD+ and base their actions on, a 
majority indicated scientific articles, among a number of other sources (Table 10).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Available on www.reddtz.org (29 May, 2012) 
7 Survey respondents were asked to rank different knowledge types in their order of relevance for REDD+ policy 
decisions. The types were defined as ‘Local knowledge’: anchored in a certain local context, incl. traditional 
knowledge; ‘Practical knowledge’ of societal actors accumulated e.g. through project implementation; ‘Political 
knowledge’: experience of previous policy processes; and ‘Research-based knowledge’, incl. scientific knowledge: 
follows a scientific method acknowledged by peers (van Kerkhoff & Lebel, 2006).   
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Table 10. Sources of REDD+ relevant knowledgeª among the survey respondents.   
 
Source All actors (%, 
n=46º) 
Organizations with a REDD+ 
knowledge dissemination 
mission (%, n=28) 
Direct stakeholder consultations and discussion forums 78 86 
Scientific articles 76 93 
Research reports 67 75 
In-house expertise and research 65 86 
Media: newspapers, TV, radio, documentaries etc. 59 75 
Local communities 50 71 
Email lists and online forums 48 50 
External key experts and advisors 41 50 
Specifically mentioned  
Research reports from (times mentioned) External experts (times mentioned) 
Website reddtz.org and in-depth studies commissioned by 
the national Task Force (4) 
US-based NGO-affiliated experts (4) 
CIFOR (3) UK and US-based academics (3) 
UNFCCC, IPCC (2) National academics (3) 
International research projects with Tanzanian partners (2) UN (UN-REDD, FAO, UNDP-GEF), FCPF (2) 
National universities (2) CGIAR (1) 
Foreign government agencies (2) NORAD (1) 
Other international organizations, each mentioned once (5)  
ª Question in a fixed-choice format, with a request to mention additional sources as pertinent. 
º Note the difference to N total survey respondents: only actors with a strong REDD+ knowledge dissemination mission were 
requested to answer the question, but some others did, too.  
 
 
Among the surveyed organizations, 28 had a specific mission of facilitating the diffusion of REDD+ 
relevant knowledge among national REDD+ policy stakeholders, and 12 of them considered themselves 
government advisors in REDD+ policy issues. When inquired about their motives, the vast majority 
(93%) of these 28 actors indicated that locally felt problems, based on empirical consultations, determined 
the focus of their knowledge dissemination efforts8. The global policy agenda and processes were also 
relevant to 79% of them. Half of them were influenced by the interests of the scientific community, 46% 
by knowledge requests by partners, and 43% by requirements by donors. The concrete activities9 
undertaken in order to link knowledge to the action of policymaking are presented in Table 11.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Question in a fixed-choice format, with a request to mention additional factors as pertinent. 
9 As previous. 
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Table 11. Activities undertaken by actors with a REDD knowledge dissemination mission in order to 
inform the REDD+ policy process.  
 
Activity %, n=28 
Re-packaging information so that it is easier disclosed to wider 
audiences, for example through reports, pamphlets, posters, press 
releases, email newsletters etc. 
89 
Informal discussions with key persons/organizations 86 
Convening meetings and establishing forums for dialogue 82 
Organizing training 75 
Facilitating cooperation and data exchange 50 
Publishing research results in scientific journals  39 
Funding others to undertake the above 3 
 
 
Brokerage analyses (Gould & Fernandez, 1989) revealed that few of these organizations with a REDD+ 
knowledge mission were actually occupying strategic positions in the networks of REDD+ 
communication and information, or of REDD+ scientific information flows10. The focus was on 
identifying actors connecting organizations in different groups from the broker itself (‘consultant’; 
‘liaison’ when the connected actors also belong to different groups from each other) as well as brokers 
that could be considered ‘representatives’ of their own groups, functioning as contacts with outsiders 
(Gould & Fernandez, 1989).  
 
Figures 10 – 11 present actors in ‘liaison’11 roles in the networks of REDD+ communication and 
information exchange and REDD+ scientific information exchange, with organizational type as the 
grouping attribute.  
 
                                                 
10 Treated as directed networks, considering that an information tie from actor A to actor B requires intentional 
action by actor A. 
11 Results for ‘consultant’ roles were very similar. 
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Figure 10. Network of communication and REDD+ information exchange. Size of the node reflects the 
number of times an actor is in a liaison role between otherwise unconnected actors belonging to different 
organizational groups.   
 
Many of the same actors that had been previously identified as central in this network (Table 5, Figure 3) 
occupied strategic positions as a ‘liaison’ in the network of communication and REDD+ information 
exchange (Figure 10). They included one of the governmental members of the national REDD+ Task 
Force (no. 10), the foreign government agency representing Norway (59), two national NGOs (34 and 
35), the Task Force Secretariat (22), and an intergovernmental organization (52). 
Gov't executive actor
National NGO
Educational, research
National business
International NGO
International business
Intergovernmental organization
Foreign government agency
District or village council
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Figure 11. Network of scientific information flow (transposed data; only interviewed actors have been 
included). Size of the node reflects the number of times an actor is in a liaison role between otherwise 
unconnected actors belonging to different organizational groups.   
 
In the network of scientific information flow (Figure 11), the REDD Task Force Secretariat, a research 
institute embedded in a national university, emerged in a liaison role overwhelmingly more times than 
any other actor. In addition to functioning as the Secretariat, with formal responsibilities over REDD+ 
information dissemination, it was also conducting REDD+ related research in Tanzania, and involved in 
consultancies and capacity-building on REDD+.  
 
In the following figures, actors are highlighted in the network of REDD+ communication and information 
sharing according to their position regarding the polarizing issue of a national vs. nested approach to 
REDD+ benefit sharing, and their role as a ‘representative’ of others sharing the same position (Figures 
12) or as a ‘liaison’ between different groups (Figures 13).  
 
Gov't executive actor
National NGO
Educational, research
National business
International NGO
International business
Intergovernmental organization
Foreign government agency
District or village council
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Figure 12. Network of communication and REDD+ information exchange. Size of the node reflects the 
times an actor is in a representative role between actors advocating for different approaches to REDD+ 
benefit sharing.   
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Figure 13. Network of communication and REDD+ information exchange. Size of the node reflects the 
times an actor is in a liaison role between actors advocating for different approaches to REDD+ benefit 
sharing  
 
Another way of looking at actor strategic positions in networks is through investigating how likely they 
are to form ties with other actors belonging to the same group according to a pre-defined attribute. These 
measures of homophily for the key actors, identified through centrality and brokerage measures, are 
presented in Table 12, with organizational type as the partitioning variable.  
 
Table 12. Homophily (E-1 scoreª) for key actors in networks of REDD+ communication and information 
sharing, collaboration and scientific information flows.   
 
Organization, code no. Communication and 
REDD+ information  
REDD+ collaboration Scientific information  
10 0.444 0.543 0.895 
19 -0.600 0.167 -1.000 
22 0.800 0.833 0.786 
59 0.800 0.000 1.000 
34 0.462 0.579 0.778 
35 0.238 0.000 1.000 
  ªNote: -1: maximum homophily and +1: max heterophily. Partitioning variable: organizational type. 
 
What the homophily scores tell us is that overall, the key actors are not specifically prone to limiting 
information exchange and collaboration within their own organizational groupings (except for the 
government Task Force member no. 19). On the contrary, they highlight the role of these actors in 
connecting to various groups, as is also supported by the brokerage measures (Figures 10 – 13).  
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Qualitative analysis of the knowledge pathways of the key actors supported the notion of their heterophily 
regarding organizational affiliation. One of the most central government actors in all networks (and see 
brokerage roles in Figures 10, 12 and 13), no. 10, referred to a long list of regular organizational sources 
of REDD+ relevant knowledge, including national academic institutions, domestic and international 
NGOs implementing REDD+ pilot projects, and multilateral projects and organizations (though none of 
them outside of the domestic REDD+ policy domain). The numerous sources were explained by the 
current situation of ambiguity and complexity in which a lot of learning was going on and it was desirable 
draw from as many sources as possible. “We are not yet in a situation to say some information is not 
relevant” (in-depth interview, 26 April 2011). The other government Task Force member, no. 19, which 
held a central position in the network of collaboration but not in the communication network (Table 5), 
described a smaller pool of sources of REDD+ policy relevant knowledge. It mostly consisted of 
organizational sources based in Tanzania, but also included scientific articles, IPCC reports, and study 
tours to Norway, Brazil and Australia that the bilateral cooperation with Norway had enabled.  
 
The Norwegian government representative emerged in a key liaison position between different 
organizational groups (Figure 10) as well as a neutral liaison between the coalitions for a national and a 
nested approach in the communication network (Figure 13). This observation may be unsurprising 
considering their established formal links to a number of core actors through financing of the national 
REDD+ strategy development and the REDD+ pilot projects. This actor utilized a variety of international 
knowledge sources in addition to the Tanzanian experiences that were to inform the policy process.  
 
The national REDD+ Task Force Secretariat was overwhelmingly salient as a broker in the scientific 
information network (Figure 11), and also prominent as a liaison between those favouring a national 
approach and those advocating for a nested approach. In the survey, it maintained a neutral position 
towards the majority of the issues, including the question of nested vs. national approach in REDD+ 
benefit sharing. Yet, it was perceived as taking sides by the CSOs, the representatives of which doubted 
its capacity or willingness to pass on their views and ideas to the Task Force. At the same time, it was 
applauded by some actors as very successful in mediating between the different government agencies 
involved. Holding strategic positions in the networks, it stands to benefit from maintaining its official role 
as the REDD+ policy process facilitator.  
 
The national NGOs no. 34 and 35 emerged as key players in the network of REDD+ communication and 
information exchange, and representatives of the discourse coalition for community rights and nested 
approach to benefit sharing. Despite their focus on domestic REDD+ issues and being very orientated 
towards local challenges in natural resource governance, they had been actively part of many international 
research and advocacy collaborations during the whole timeline of the REDD+ policy process. This, 
together with a large constituency domestically (especially no. 35 as an umbrella organization by 
definition), might work to legitimize their knowledge and discourse. They were also well connected to 
other central players as part of the core structures in the networks. Collaboration with and inclusion by 
government actor no. 10 is likely to have helped their positions in the REDD+ domain, in addition to the 
deliberate advocacy efforts through the protest events.     
 
Deliberative quality of the policy process 
 
In spite of the official goal of an interactive, participatory REDD+ strategy development process, the 
majority of the interviewees (excluding representatives of government organizations) saw shortcomings 
in the consultations and integration of the different viewpoints into policy development. The most 
frequently mentioned concerns were related to the representation of the voices of the forest-adjacent 
communities that REDD will affect. It was suggested that the zonal consultations which gathered 
participants from some civil society organizations and regional and district governments, but not all, and 
virtually none from the community level, missed out on the largest segment of REDD+ stakeholders in 
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the country. The timing and the modalities of the zonal consultations only a couple of months after the 
first draft national REDD+ strategy had been released were also criticized. “...We have no opportunities 
for in-depth discussions with anybody of consequence. Because the timing and the venues and the 
processes used in this discussion are so superficial…. it’s very large groups, it’s very rushed, issues are 
sort of noted and then they disappear. You don’t feel that there is a serious in-depth debate that engages 
societal actors […] When I contrast that to the quality of the debate that we have had between each other 
as civil society organizations, you can’t say the same thing in consultations on the national process, there 
is no space for that” (international NGO representative, March 14, 2011). Many of the interviewees were 
not aware of the zonal consultations, including representatives of one of the most central organizations 
(Table 5). At the same time, difficulties in engaging all relevant actors out of such an enormous pool of 
national stakeholders were sympathized with. It was stated that the only thing to do was to continue the 
consultations at all levels while investing heavily in awareness raising on REDD+.  “You could poke 
holes in the current consultation process, too, until you’re tired basically. If I look at the bigger picture 
and compare it with other policy processes, it’s certainly far stronger. Where it needs to build now is to be 
kind of more holistic […] The Task Force I know are thinking the same way. But it needs to be realized” 
(foreign government representative, April 6, 2011).      
 
Whether the CSO actors were cognitively aware of their positions in the networks – some of which 
appear very conducive for influence – or not, most of them, especially the national NGOs and businesses, 
were very pessimistic about their chances of influencing the policy process and content. The government 
discourse of ambiguity was seen as both a window of opportunity, as well as a challenge for meaningful 
deliberation. “No, I don’t think they [CSO inputs] have been seriously considered, but on the other hand 
they have not been rejected, either. I think they have been shelved for dealing with later […] My hope is, 
for example, the governance technical working group which is supposed to be dealing with safeguards 
could be a very interesting venue to insert ideas and watch them trickle up” (international NGO 
representative, March 14, 2011). “It [first draft national REDD+ strategy] is very bland and broad, when 
clearly, when we have conversations with them [Task Force members], you can see that they have very 
strong viewpoints on the way that things should be done, and yet, those viewpoints are not being put in an 
official, public way in which you could actually challenge them and make comments on them” (national 
NGO representative, 30 March 2011). 
 
Recent developments in the policy process  
 
Following repeated demands by the CSOs to broaden the organizational base of the national REDD+ 
Task Force, and the notions shared by various policy actors regarding weak intersectoral coordination in 
the Tanzanian REDD+ policy process (cf. Table 8), the Task Force was expanded in February 2012. It 
now consists of six new governmental members (organizations no. 3, 5, 6, and 9 in this report, as well as 
two other ministries not included in the analysis) and one CSO member (34), in addition to the original 
three governmental members (4, 10, and 19). The CSO member was elected through online voting by the 
member organizations of the Tanzania Forestry Working Group and the REDD pilot projects, among 
candidates proposed by the same organizations12. This process formalized the strategic position of 
organization 34 as the representative of the CSO voices, already reflected in the network data from 2011 
(Table 5; Figures 3, 7, 10, 12).    
 
Convened during 2011 and officially launched at the same time with the expanded Task Force, special 
‘Thematic Working Groups’ have begun working on five thematic areas with the purpose of providing 
technical knowledge for the national REDD+ strategy development. These include  
 
                                                 
12 The author observed the process through subscribing to the email lists but did not take part in the voting which 
was restricted to the member organizations only.  
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• ‘Legal, Governance and Safeguards’  
• ‘Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV)’  
• ‘Financial Mechanism: REDD+ Fund’  
• ‘Energy Drivers’  
• ‘Agriculture Drivers’ (National REDD+ Secretariat, 2012).  
 
While the organizational members of the working groups have not been publicly disclosed, the members 
were said to have been “nominated by their respective institutions and comprised of the government, 
research and academia, private sectors and civil society organizations” (National REDD+ Secretariat, 
2012: 2). 
 
The expansion of the Task Force, and the composition and thematic areas of the Working Groups, map 
onto the main concerns of the policy actors regarding challenges for REDD+ in Tanzania (Table 8). The 
full second draft of the national REDD+ strategy, which ought to incorporate the various stakeholder 
views from the consultations in 2011, was not yet publicly available at the time this paper was drafted. 
Hence the content of an Executive Summary of the draft, dated November 2011 (URT, 2011), was 
analyzed in terms of the salience of the key concepts promoted by the different coalitions. Issues of 
governance and tenure feature extensively; several propositions to decrease perverse incentives and elite 
capture of REDD+ benefits, and to scale up the implementation of the decentralized land and forest 
policies, including building local government and communities’ capacities, have been included. 
Safeguards, advocated for by the CSOs, are explicitly referred to various times in the draft strategy 
summary (including goals for developing a national safeguards framework and implementing Strategic 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessments), in addition to being the focus of one of the Working 
Groups. At the same time, the position that the majority of the forests are currently situated on general 
land, and open access, remains in the strategy summary document (URT, 2011: 2). There appears to be a 
focus on launching more studies on the relevant institutional arrangements for REDD+ and land tenure 
systems [although at the same time, an output ‘REDD+ related land tenure system in place and 
operational by 2012’ is included (URT, 2011: 16)], despite previous studies during the official ‘analytic 
phase’ of  policy development, and the CSO suggestions that the current system just needs to be better 
implemented.  
 
Furthermore, it seems clear from the Financial Mechanism Working Group title and the draft strategy 
summary that the Task Force will push on with the idea of a centralized REDD+ trust fund, envisioned to 
be in place by the end of 2012 (URT, 2011: 12). The establishment of the REDD+ trust fund is supposed 
to include the assessment of “the performance of past forest revenue management systems, benefit 
sharing and incentive schemes” (URT, 2011: 8).    
 
Recently, the parliament has requested information on REDD from the Task Force to “better inform high 
level debate and decision making” (TNRF, 2012). This could be an indication that while still dominated 
by government executive officials, CSOs and the donor community, the REDD+ policy debate might 
soon move to the legislative arena.    
5. Discussion 
The two main inter-organizational constellations with a strong interest in the Tanzanian REDD+ policy 
domain may be best described as loose discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1995), with considerable conceptual 
overlap in their arguments regarding the policy problem. The characteristics and strategies of the “protest 
coalition”, a group of CSOs behind the protest events, also resemble those of an advocacy coalition 
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993): a group of actors that share strong normative beliefs and repeatedly act 
in concert to promote their discourse. Szarka (2004) has suggested that advocacy coalitions may be 
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treated as a subset of discourse coalitions, which seems like an adequate description of the current 
situation. The other coalition, centred in the original national REDD+ Task Force members and 
characterized by a vision of a strong government role, appears not driven by shared core beliefs as such, 
but more pragmatic concerns over implementing their executive roles. In dealing with ambiguity, the 
government coalition draws from the same concepts as the other coalition, but without a clearly shared 
understanding of those concepts. The storylines of most members of this loose discourse coalition are not 
as coherent and consistent as those of the CSOs.  
 
Although the individual members of the protest coalition were cynical about their chances of influencing 
the REDD+ policy process and policy content, it appears that through persistent efforts to publicize the 
policy process, they have gained discursive space from the government organizations. The core frames of 
their discourse – equity in participation and benefit sharing, operationalized through attention to rights 
and safeguards – are so salient on the global REDD+ policy agenda that it is impossible for the opposing 
coalition to sideline them without risking loss of support domestically and internationally. As a result, 
both coalitions draw from the same pool of concepts, but it could be argued that the protest coalition does 
it more convincingly and effectively. By doing so, the CSOs have forced themselves into the policy arena, 
and become officially recognized core participants, pushing for the enhanced legitimacy of the policy.   
 
It is noteworthy that the strategic positions of the core members of the current “protest coalition” in the 
relational space extend beyond the REDD+ policy process to a broader national deliberation on forest 
governance. Furthermore, they have long established connections to the global advocacy community on 
forest governance and REDD+. It is plausible that the success of this coalition in gaining discursive space 
would have been more limited if all members of the coalition had been peripheral actors to start with.  
 
The limits to discursive gain by the protest coalition are apparent in the issue of centralized benefit 
sharing. It seems clear that the Task Force is fully committed to the idea of a centralized REDD+ trust 
fund and will continue to push it. It may be the right time to focus advocacy efforts on issues where some 
conceptual agreement exists, at least superficially or to a certain degree, concentrating on achieving 
concrete commitments to secure communities’ rights to benefits and social and environmental safeguards. 
The government coalition may be avoiding these commitments by maintaining a discourse of ambiguity, 
even when there is relevant evidence, but it will have less and less space to do so when faced with 
consistent, publicized demands.  
 
Despite both main coalitions being represented in the core REDD+ policy structures, the inclusiveness 
and legitimacy of the process may still be questioned. Private sector, apart from REDD consultants, is 
virtually absent in the policy networks. And how effective are the CSOs in truly representing the interests 
of the rural population that stands to lose most from REDD related forest access restrictions? Assessing 
the quality of this representation will be crucial. The local governments and villages included in the 
analysis, while showing ideational congruence with the CSOs (Figure 9, Table 9), are only linked to the 
broader policy networks through the REDD piloting NGO in their area (Figures 3 and 10). After all, the 
frames by the CSOs on risks associated with national rewarding, as well as those anticipated in relation to 
direct subnational market linkages by the government, are both based on previous experience. It could be 
argued that neither approach is objectively “fairer” than the other, and that similar assumptions of 
transparency and accountability hold regarding the two.    
  
The policy actors that emerge as key brokers in the networks are mostly domestic organizations. Although 
informing the REDD+ policy process is high on their agenda, this typically involves repackaging 
knowledge in such a way that it supports their advocacy. Organizations that are traditionally characterized 
by a strong mandate of linking knowledge to action, such as research organizations and some 
international and multilateral organizations, do not occupy network positions that are strategic for 
information flow (apart from the Task Force Secretariat). The qualitative analysis supports the notion that 
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research organizations and research-based knowledge do not feature in the frontline of the REDD+ policy 
debate in Tanzania, despite a large number of the policy actors stating that they have REDD+ knowledge 
gaps. Perhaps this is a reflection of the hard task that Hajer and Laws (2006) envision for a good policy 
advisor: pulling in the direction of clarity while illuminating precisely what we do not understand. By 
focusing on the technical details of MRV, deemed the most complex, expert knowledge requiring area of 
REDD+, scientific experts get marginalized in the discussion by actors with clear, seemingly 
unambiguous messages on ‘unscientific’ ethical-normative issues.  
 
While the REDD+ policy process in Tanzania remains at a stage in which politically mandated decision 
makers are yet to get involved in the debate, the experiences from the process so far provide some 
promising indications that publicized and targeted advocacy efforts may widen the deliberative space and 
the scope for influence by various policy actors spanning different sectors of the society. The study also 
highlights how their influence is constrained by the relational resources of the various actors and the 
institutional context. Future analysis of the data of which this Working Paper provides an overview might 
reveal how deliberation plays out within the discourse coalitions and the institutionalized collaboration 
structures, how intra-coalition dynamics translate into political action, and whether and how formal 
decision making reflects the agenda-setting and agency of the coalitions that appear successful at the early 
stages of the policy process. To move closer to an evaluation of the legitimacy and effectiveness of the 
policy process, future research should also assess the lines of accountability of key actors, and the quality 
of vertical representation between brokers and their ‘constituents’. Importantly, it will also have to take 
into account the changing policy context beyond the national REDD+ domain, especially regarding 
international commitments to climate change mitigation, which is likely to determine to a great extent 
whether and in which form the REDD+ policy agenda moves forward in Tanzania.    
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1. Timeline of the REDD+ policy process in Tanzania.  
 
 
 
Note: Key policy and protest events included in the analysis are highlighted in the red-lined boxes.  
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Appendix 2. Distribution of organizational actors’ stances on selected REDD+ policy issues 
based on the analysis of the structured survey data.  
 
 
 
Figure II.  Boxplots of selected statements related to REDD+ as a global and national policy 
instrument (N respondents = 64).  
Key: 0 - Not known / no response; 1 – Strongly disagree; 2 – Disagree; 3 - Neither agree nor 
disagree; 4 – Agree; 5 – Strongly agree.   
 
REDD is an effective option for reducing green 
house gas emissions globally.  
REDD is a financially affordable way to 
mitigate climate change.  
REDD will assure fairness in the international 
distribution of environmental costs and 
benefits.   
REDD schemes are also likely to help countries 
to cope or to adapt to the consequences of 
climate change.   
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Figure III.  Boxplots of selected statements related to REDD+, biodiversity and people (N 
respondents = 64).   
Key: 0 - Not known / no response; 1 – Strongly disagree; 2 – Disagree; 3 - Neither agree nor 
disagree; 4 – Agree; 5 – Strongly agree.   
 
 
 
All REDD schemes aimed at reducing CO2 
emissions should also all require the realization 
of other key benefits such as poverty reduction 
and maintenance of biodiversity. 
REDD should mainly reward local people for 
emission reduction activities. 
REDD schemes will be an important resource 
to reduce poverty. 
Without the involvement of local people in the 
implementation, REDD projects are unlikely to 
be effective. 
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Figure III.  Boxplots of selected statements related to challenges for achieving an effective 
national REDD+ strategy (N respondents = 64). 
Key: 0 - Not known / no response; 1 – Strongly disagree; 2 – Disagree; 3 - Neither agree nor 
disagree; 4 – Agree; 5 – Strongly agree.   
One of the main challenges for an effective REDD national strategy is … 
… lack of knowledge and 
awareness of REDD by relevant 
stakeholders. 
… achieving effective 
coordination between state 
agencies, private sector, and civil 
society. 
… the lack of technical expertise 
for monitoring carbon emissions 
and sequestration. 
…. the delay in the clarification 
of tenure rights. 
… contradictions between forest 
and agriculture and other 
sectoral laws and regulations. 
… social conflict and local 
resistance. 
… effectively addressing main 
drivers of deforestation without 
compromising  development 
objectives. 
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Figure IV.  Boxplots of selected statements related to REDD+ financial flows and accounting 
(N respondents = 64).  
Key: 0 - Not known / no response; 1 – Strongly disagree; 2 – Disagree; 3 - Neither agree nor 
disagree; 4 – Agree; 5 – Strongly agree.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REDD schemes should only be financed 
through funds. 
All REDD accounting and payments should go 
through the national governments.  
In the long-run REDD should be included in 
schemes to offset credits in compliance carbon 
markets. 
A national approach (for reference levels, 
MRV, rewards etc.) is necessary to ensure the 
effectiveness of REDD schemes (as compared 
to a project-based approach). 
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Appendix 3. Networks of core actors in protest events.  
 
 
 
Actors participating in…  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key:  
Line width: number of shared events (1-5) 
 
Green: national NGO;  
Turquoise: international NGO;  
Grey: private national business 
 
Size of node: in-degree centrality in the 
network of collaboration in REDD+ policy 
issues 
 
At least one protest event 
At least three protest events 
All five protest events 
At least four protest events 
At least two protest events 
